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Western and Indian theories of consciousness confronted 
A comparative overview of continental and analytic philosophy with Advaita Vedanta and 
Madhyamaka Buddhism 
 
 
Abstract 
The burgeoning field of cognitive studies in the West is motivated by a renewed interest in 
conscious experience, which arose in the postmodern zeitgeist in response to the positivist, 
scientific ideal of objectivity. This work presents a historical overview of Western philosophy 
from its dawn, focusing on the evolution of key concepts in metaphysics, ontology and 
epistemology, to arrive at the examination of modern theories on consciousness.  
The monist systems of pre-Socratic philosophers, the empiricism and rationalism of the 
Humanism, Kant’s critique and the post-Kantian split of traditions in the analytic and continental 
branches are surveyed. A summary of the key historical concepts of consciousness in the 
continental tradition, and especially in German idealism and phenomenology is presented. 
Modern physicalist theories of mind based on epistemological realism, in the analytic tradition 
are sketched, and critical aspects of the realist viewpoint discussed. The reintroduction of the 
phenomenal perspective in philosophy of mind, is argued, represents an important turning point 
in analytic philosophy.  
In the second part, the philosophic-religious traditions of Advaita Vedanta and Mahayana 
Buddhism, in its Madhyamaka branch, are presented, and their respective notions of self, mind 
and reality confronted. The concept of consciousness as an ontological substance is, in 
Buddhism, deconstructed through the analysis of impermanence and interdependent origination 
of phenomena. In Advaita philosophy consciousness is equated with the universal Brahman, 
although no duality is admitted between Brahman and the world. The phenomenological analysis 
of self in this tradition differs from the Western notion of “transcendental ego” through an 
understanding of intentionality as a superimposition of subject-object duality on pure 
consciousness. A core theory of nonduality between the conscious principle and the world is then 
extracted from the apparently opposite ontological stances of Mahayana and Advaita.  
This theory is finally compared with the Western idealist and realist conceptions of 
consciousness, intentionality and subject-object duality.  The nondualism of the Indian systems, 
is argued, represents a possible resolution of the ontological and epistemological problems of 
Western philosophy. 
 
Keywords: consciousness, nonduality, phenomenology, Advaita Vedanta, Madhyamaka 
Buddhism, epistemology. 
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PART I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To the best of our current knowledge there is no thing, no indivisible entity that is us, neither in 
the brain nor in some metaphysical realm beyond this world. So when we speak of conscious 
experience as a subjective phenomenon, what is the entity having these experiences? 
Thomas Metzinger 
 
 
 
For anyone who at the end of Western philosophy can and must still question philosophically, the 
decisive question is no longer merely “What basic character do beings manifest?” or “How may 
the being of beings be characterized?” but “What is this ‘being’ itself?”  
Martin Heidegger 
 
 
 
The ego in its purity is experienced in the interval between two states or between two thoughts. 
You should realize this interval as the abiding, unchangeable reality, your true Being. 
Ramana Maharshi 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Historical background 
The main topic investigated in this study is consciousness. This emerges throughout the 
evolution of Western and Eastern philosophy as a pivotal issue, reflecting the dominant 
conception of life, self and reality.  
Philosophic inquiry started in the West as an analysis of the notion of being, or existence in se. 
This was considered an absolute dimension transcending the human mind, without possibility of 
definition, and accessible only through intuition. Already in pre-Socratic philosophy, however, 
solutions were sought to harmonize this metaphysical dimension with the manifest world of 
matter and change. An idealist current, which can be traced back to Plato, underlined the non-
physical and transcendent character of being, while a realist one, associated with Aristotle, 
focused on a more objective and empirical study of particulars as constituents of existence. These 
conceptions were later transposed in Christian theology through the assimilation of being with 
God; the Patristic tradition adopted Platonism as its philosophical foundation, while 
Aristotelianism became prevalent in Scholastic theology.  After the decline of Scholasticism, the 
philosophic notion of being was set aside and, in the Humanism, was replaced by that of 
consciousness intended as the subjective mind (sec. e.g. Locke and Descartes). The assimilation 
of consciousness with subjectivity crystallized a shift from a “logocentric” to an 
“anthropocentric” ontology, based on the definition of man as the subject and reference point of 
epistemic knowledge. This resulted in a dualism which generated the subsidiary problems of 
investigating the interaction between mind and body and consciousness and world. The inquiry 
of the natural world became considered, in time, as an independent, empirical enterprise, 
separable from metaphysical or theological principles, and even objective or observer-
independent. Under the aegis of materialism, in the beginning of the 20th century, consciousness 
itself came to be finally negated in positivist philosophy, through the adoption of so called 
eliminativist theories.  
The modern philosophical analysis of consciousness is mainly dominated by two alternative 
conceptions, an objective (empirical-realist) and subjective (rationalist-idealist). In the first, the 
mind is regarded as a mechanistic feature outcome of the body’s physiology, in the second as a 
subjective, “introspectable” element implying a substance-dualism. The distinction between the 
continental and analytic philosophic traditions, and the corresponding divide between humanistic 
and scientific disciplines, reflect the adoption of a subjective/ideal or an objective/empirical 
approach respectively. Both philosophical stances present theoretical impasses which are 
discussed in this study.  
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Theoretical problems  
A major difficulty of rationalist philosophy is the notion of the disembodied self, intended as a 
subjective, inner observer separate from the physiological constitution of the body, ensuing from 
the identification of consciousness with a Cartesian ego (or transcendental ego, in idealist 
currents). This results in a dualistic epistemic scheme of knower-known vulnerable to skeptical 
objections. Empiricist conceptions, on the other hand, downplay the importance of 
consciousness, and do not address the phenomenological character of experiences (the notion of 
“what it feels like” to experience, or to be endowed with sentience). Materialist theories of mind 
affirm the independence and objectivity of the empirical world, sometimes to the extent of 
denying consciousness, because its reality would seem to imply the existence of a substantial 
ego. These conceptual problems, and the ensuing contrapositions in Western philosophy and 
science, it is maintained, derive from the assimilation of consciousness with subjectivity through 
investment in the psychological notion of self. An increased awareness of this problem can be 
perceived in disciplines such as psychology and neurology, which, beginning from the 1980’s 
have started to endorse a “postcognitive” understanding of self as a process rather than as an 
“inherently existing entity” (cf. e.g. Metzinger 2009, Baggini 2011 and Damasio 2012).  In spite 
of these recent developments, perduring notions of “disembodiedness”, outcome of the subject-
object duality, or alternatively physicalist theories which negate consciousness, still permeate the 
debate in epistemology and dominate folk-psychological representations. 
 
Purpose and scope of the work  
The acknowledgement of these theoretical issues in the Western understanding of consciousness, 
prompted me to formulate the following research question: is it possible to devise a theoretical 
framework of consciousness which retains its fundamental character in phenomenal cognition, 
without incurring in the problem of reification and subject-object duality? 
In order to address this issue, a comparative analysis with Eastern traditions, specifically Hindu 
Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamaka Buddhism was carried out. The choice of these schools is 
motivated by their engagement in the philosophical study of consciousness, accomplishing 
syntheses which are considered, in their cultural contexts, complete expositions on the subject. 
The cross-cultural analysis of Advaita Vedanta and Madhyamaka Buddhism is based on David 
Loy’s work “Nonduality: a study in comparative philosophy” (1988). The thesis advanced by the 
author is that these traditions share a “core theory” represented by the notion of nonduality, 
which represents a “final” standpoint about the nature of consciousness, knowledge and reality. 
This concept refers to the ultimately illusory nature of the ontological divide between opposites, 
and is applied to the notion of selfhood and associated with soteriological experiences of 
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liberation (nirvana, bodhi). The negation of self is considered of major importance in the 
economy of the doctrine of awakening (cessation from suffering and rebirth) and implies the 
shifting of ontological reality from the human mind to an absolute principle defined as Brahman 
in Hindu philosophy, or void or nothingness in Mahayana Buddhism. The choice of Loy’s work, 
among other comparative studies, is based on its thoroughness and systematicity of philosophical 
exposition of the concept of nonduality, which is addressed from different angles (i.e. perception, 
action and thinking). 
The relevance of this perspective in philosophy of mind, I propose, is represented by the 
possibility of resolving conceptual oppositions such as the mind-body, consciousness-matter and 
subjectivity-objectivity through an understanding of consciousness as nondual. This implies the 
necessity of reformulating phenomenological theories, through a revision of the notion of 
subjectivity. The concept of self in Western phenomenology is reiterated by the notion of a 
“witnessing consciousness”, and of a “transcendental ego” in idealistic currents, which maintain 
a subtle duality between subject and object. The Indian traditions, through the negation of self 
affirm, instead, the non-intentional structure of consciousness, that is, its lack of subject-object 
duality; the latter is considered a language-based, thought-constructed superimposition upon a 
phenomenologically neutral experience. This ultimate reality is intended as a pre-reflective 
substratum which reveals itself as a phenomenological experience of “wholeness” in Advaita, or 
“emptiness” in Buddhism.  
The claim of nonduality is not an Eastern prerogative, and this study shows parallels with the 
Western metaphysical notion of being, as endorsed by philosophers such as Parmenides, 
Heraclitus, Plotinus, Spinoza and Shelling, among others.  
The recent reopening of the questioning of consciousness, in analytic philosophy, is nowadays 
stimulating a cross-disciplinary dissemination between fields, which integrates the 
experimental/scientific and phenomenological/cognitive perspectives.  This study, I believe, may 
contribute to the growing interdisciplinary debate by showing the convergence of religious-
philosophic ideas, through the exposition of the philosophical notion of consciousness and 
nonduality, with scientific fields of inquiry traditionally held separate, such as anthropology, 
sociology, psychology and neurology. These outcomes may, however, only be hinted at within 
the scope of this work. Its main focus will be, therefore, circumscribed to comparing and 
discussing modern models of consciousness, self and subjectivity, with the purpose to show how 
epistemological problems in Western philosophy can be overcome through a nondual theory.  
 
Note on translating conventions: in order to facilitate the lecture, I have decided to rendered 
Sanskrit and Pali terms without diacritic marks and accents and to render them with the closest 
English pronunciation. 
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2. BEING AND BECOMING IN ANCIENT GREEK THOUGHT 
The origin of western philosophic thought can be traced back to the 6th century BCE, when 
rational forms of inquiry about the world developed in competition with mythological, religious 
narratives, which had constituted up to then the predominant means of conveying cosmological 
and metaphysical notions.  
Philosophy was intended, in Hellenistic times, as an inquiry into the nature of reality which 
started from the study of being, or existence in se. This was the domain of metaphysics, which 
was the basic branch of philosophy from which all others (e.g., ontology, epistemology, ethics) 
derived. Common topics addressed were those of substance, time, change, the nature of sensory 
things and their properties, cause and effect, etc. The study of physical reality was known as 
natural philosophy and was seen as a subset of questions focusing on the tangible aspect of 
existence, dependent on metaphysical principles encompassing what is “beyond” (metá) the 
material (physis).   
The pre-Socratic philosophers’ interests revolved around the issues of the nature of being, the 
fundamental substance of existence, and the problems posed by time and change in the world. 
One of the earliest, major philosophical debates recorded was between Heraclitus and 
Parmenides who formulated two opposed monist systems based on the contrasting aspects of 
Being and Becoming.  
Heraclitus’ philosophy of becoming acknowledged the kosmos (world order) as a never ending 
process of change through the interplay of opposite forces, continuously transforming into each 
other in a system of balanced exchanges (Graham in IEP, 2005). The process was described as an 
eternal fire which symbolized endless permutation, and sometimes also as a river, which owned 
its permanence to the flux of water. Heraclitus posited the logos as a unity underlying change, in 
which flux and interplay of opposite dualities were the necessary conditions for its manifest 
existence. Fire, although generating other elements, did not represent a substance which ultimate 
reality consisted of, as in the pre-Socratics’ doctrines of origination from a single element, but 
was conceived as a deeper unity embodying the manifestation of opposites (Graham in Mautner 
2005, 271-272). 
Parmenides, who wrote presumably shortly after Heraclitus, rejected the notion of a plurality of 
opposed substances, which he considered outcome of a naturalistic cosmology, and endeavored 
to defend the ontological unity of the cosmos through the logic of non-contradiction. In his poem 
On nature he describes being (the logos), as: immobile, not subject to becoming; one, as 
multiplicity would imply non-being; eternal, not starting and ending at some point; 
unborn/uncaused; and indivisible, as separation would cause gaps of non-being within itself. 
Furthermore he drew a distinction between subjective opinion (doxa), from truth (alatheia). The 
first represented what could perhaps be called a commonsense view of the world (intended 
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throughout the text as naïve realism), in which sensory appearances are deemed real, while the 
latter was a form of idealism which considered phenomena deceptive appearances. Phenomena 
were not empirically negated by Parmenides, but considered “instances of becoming”. These 
were not to be reified into ontological realities (separate instances or beings), as that would lead 
to admit the existence of non-being and to infringe the logic of non-contradiction.  
Parmenides has been known to write his treatise in response to Heraclitus. The contraposition 
between philosophers, however, has been historically overemphasized and much of the tension 
between their doctrines may be ascribed to mischaracterization by contemporary commentators. 
Heraclitus’ philosophy was, in fact, taken to imply a dualistic conflict of opposites, while 
Parmenides’ as an absolute monism which denied the existence of the world (ibid., 453).  
In any case the two philosophies raised a heated discussion which had repercussions in the later 
philosophic and religious developments in the Greek-Roman world. Parmenides’ position 
became eventually prevalent, but gave rise to an effort to mediate between the rigorous 
intellectual rationality of the immutable being and the “irrational”, sensible world of changing 
forms. 
This concern would become of major importance for Plato, who developed his theory of ideas to 
account for the manifestation of the material world (thus admittedly committing “parricide” 
against Parmenides). Plato maintained that the emanation from the pure world of ideas (forms) 
toward the sensible world of becoming and of matter produced the existence of particulars, 
which were not things in themselves but only reflexes of the eidetic world. He also introduced a 
difference between being and existence (etym.: to stand outside) and conceived mankind as 
cosmologically located between the poles of being and non-being. Evil, which was a 
characteristic of materiality, was conceived as a progressive distancing from the Good into the 
realm of matter; this was however, not an entity existing in itself, but possessed only an indirect 
existence as a form of non-being, just as the essence of shadow is lack of light. This concept was 
later integrated in Augustinian theology with consequences both in the moral sphere and in the 
epistemological relation between the soul and body. 
A further brake with Parmenides’ monism was introduced by Aristotle who, in turn, refuted the 
Platonic idealist theory of a transcendental world of forms and tried to account for the problem of 
becoming by introducing the concepts of potentiality and actuality. He acknowledged that the 
problem of change was of major importance because it affected the essence of things. Change is 
the process through which one thing loses some characteristics (accidents) and gains new ones, 
but the logical constraints posed by Parmenides’ metaphysics denied its possibility. Aristotle 
maintained that existence presented itself in the form of a singular substance, which possessed 
two complementary aspects: form and matter (hylomorphism). Potentiality was an attribute of 
matter, while actuality pertained to form (the only pure form being God). Change was admitted 
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as an actualization of the essence of a thing, which represented the movement from a state of 
potentiality to one of actuality, although always an imperfect one, as full actuality would imply 
the cessation of movement. The universe represented, in this view, a perpetual state of flux of 
substance toward its teleological goal of pure essence, that is, God, which gave it dynamism as 
Prime Mover and final cause (ibid.: 43-47).  
Aristotelian philosophy came, in spite of the metaphysical underlying structure, to be associated 
with realism, which presupposes an analysis of reality starting from empirical entities 
(particulars), and represents a first step toward an inquiry of “things in themselves”. This view 
can be contrasted to Platonism which, through the postulation of universals and negation of the 
sensible world (not existent per se and unknowable), was idealistic. Platonism exerted 
throughout Antiquity an enormous influence on mystical currents such as Gnosticism and 
Neoplatonism, and came to be adopted in Patristic Christianity as the philosophical cornerstone 
of the doctrine of incarnation.  In Scholastic theology, however, Aristotelianism became the 
orthodox position of the Church, through the reintroduction of the philosopher’s works in the 
West via Arabic sources, and the doctrinal redesign of Thomas Aquinas. Aristotelian philosophy 
can be seen as a precursor of modern epistemology, due to its negation of universals, which 
became intended only as modes of interpretation of the mind, and emphasis on particulars 
(nominalism). This approach to philosophy, opposed to Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ 
metaphysical monism, is at the basis of the Western notion of scientific inquiry modernly 
intended.  
 
 
3. PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM  
The crisis of Scholastic theology at the end of the XIV century marks the beginning of 
Humanism, which can be broadly intended as a group of philosophies which emphasized the 
human perspective in terms of independent agency and thinking, and operated a shift in 
epistemology from a logocentric to an anthropocentric one. Human reason had been held, in the 
Scholastic synthesis, in high regard as capable of enquiring into the mysteries of faith by logic 
(by the assimilation of truth and intelligibility with God or logos), through to the mediation of 
the revelation. 
In the post-Scholastic Renaissance and pre-modern period, however, new trends in philosophical 
inquiry including empirical and rational attitudes departed from the traditional problem of 
knowledge of the universals, and started to focus on the world and the human soul through the 
epistemic alleys of senses and mind. 
A central figure in the crystallization of these tendencies was Descartes, who, in an attempt to 
build a foundational epistemology of the subject immune to skeptical doubts, tried to construct a 
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system based on his own soul as the first ontological reality. In his analysis of the cogito he 
famously maintained that however all things (perceptions and thoughts) were liable to doubt, he 
could not deny his own existence as the one doubting (III meditation). Through producing an 
ontological argument for the existence of a (non-deceiving) God, he was able to accept the 
possibility of “clear and distinct ideas” as the basis or “solid ground” on which he was able to 
posit the existence of the external world, bodies and minds outside his own. This definition of 
knowledge was a reiteration of the Platonic formula justified, true belief, which implied some 
form of dualistic representation in the mind of the external world. This conception, however, 
overturned the Parmenidean notion of the subject as an immutable essence hidden within 
sensible things and representing their ontological foundation (substance), into that of an 
individual subjectivity, mind or self-consciousness. This theory constituted a prototype of a 
“metaphysics of the subject” in which the self became the first substance to which the existence 
of all the others was subordinate. Empiricist philosophers such as Locke and Hume criticized the 
reification of the self into a “substance” and the solipsism that it implied, but could not account 
for knowledge of the world without a theoretical split between the subjective and objective 
spheres of experience. The Cartesian conception left moreover still open the possibility of 
skeptical doubt, and led Hume to the rejection of the notion of rational knowledge and to the 
adoption of criteria such as habit or custom to explain any apparent cause-effect correspondence 
of the mind with the outside world. 
A major watershed is western thinking is traditionally recognized in Kant, who endeavored  to 
reconcile the empiricist and rationalist approaches by developing the notion of self as a pure, 
transcendental form or container of all the other representations. The dualism between mind and 
world was, on the other hand, reshaped into the dualism between the thing in itself (the 
unintelligible noumenon) and the subjective, phenomenological representation of it.  
Kant maintained synthetic a priori knowledge (epistemic conditions which must be present 
before any actual experience can take place) to be necessary for any cognitive act, affirming that 
the noumenal world is not knowable per se, but necessitates the human psychosomatic apparatus 
to be perceived. Such knowledge pertained therefore not the noumenon, but our own constitution 
and the structure of our interpretation (Kuehn in Mautner, 2005: 321-325). One instance of 
Kant's application of synthetic a priori knowledge was space and time, which he called “pure 
forms of intuition”. These could not be derived from the experience of objects, because cognition 
of things presupposed already the representation of space and time as a primary epistemic 
modality. Space and time subsisted, therefore, before all experience, being the intuitions by 
which men connect the phenomenal data, and are therefore "functions", i.e. modes of mind. The 
explanation given by Kant for their transcendental nature resided in that, while gaining the sense 
and meaning only if referred to the experience, however, they did not belong to it and did not 
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draw their reality from the experience. This argument, derived mostly by geometrical 
representation allowed Kant to support a weak form of  “transcendental idealism,” which 
maintained that space and time represented properties of things as they appear to us, but not 
properties or relations of things as they are in themselves. 
By positing the nature of experience “inside man” Kant's theory offered an alternative to Hume's 
skepticism. The transcendental synthesis between rationalism and empiricism which Kant 
aspired at led, however, to a sort of phenomenological mire because it maintained that the 
knowledge of the world was not possible, but only that of our structure of experience, that is, a 
complex representational web of space, time, self, body and causation.  
Kant’s work had great influence in Germany and abroad, and gave renewed impulse to 
philosophic speculation on the relationship between nature and the human modes of knowledge.  
Two major philosophical traditions arose to rework and defy the contradictions in Kant’s theory. 
In Germany, successive philosophical projects by Fichte, Shelling and Hegel focused on 
challenging the concept of thing in itself as unknowable noumenon. In Austria and England 
challenges were directed to the metaphysical structure implied in the notion of synthetic a priori, 
which Kant held as basis also of mathematics and natural science, in an effort to clean 
epistemology from metaphysics. 
 
 
4. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
The distinction between analytic and continental philosophy arose explicitly in response to 
Kantian epistemology, but can be otherwise seen as a manifestation of long-dating tendencies to 
conceive the quest for ultimate knowledge as starting from the empirical world (Aristotle) or 
from an intellectual, idealistic principle (Plato). Analytic philosophy endorses a modern, 
scientific outlook and maintains a correspondence theory of truth, that is, beliefs and 
propositions are true when compared to an “immediately accessible world” (Prado 2003, 185). 
The continental tradition holds instead the relation between mind and phenomena as much more 
problematic, and focuses on consciousness as having ontological primacy over the phenomenal 
world, which independence from the cognitive act is considered far from entirely obvious. Two 
of the most characteristic movements in the continental tradition will be presented in the coming 
chapters. Postmodern movements such as deconstruction and post-structuralism do not address 
directly the issue of consciousness and eschew the analysis of the notion of subjectivity, which 
they find problematic because it suggests the existence of a substantial ego. For this reason and 
in order to pose a limit to the scope of this study, these movements will not be presented in the 
essay.  
 
12 
 
4.1 German Idealism 
The age of German idealism is collocated in the decades 1780’s to 1840’s and represents a 
philosophic movement strictly related to other cultural and artistic currents such as Romanticism 
and Classicism taking place contemporaneously in Germany. The movement arose in the 
background of the debate which came to be known as the “pantheism controversy”, between the 
Jewish philosopher F.H. Jacobi and dramatist G. Lessing which focused on the latter’s 
endorsement of Spinozism, and to which many important philosophers of the time such as 
Mendelssohn participated.  
The coming to the fore of Spinoza's philosophy in the late eighteenth-century Germany was due 
to its contributions to the late-Enlightenment debates between religion and science, as being able 
to provide a possible alternative to materialism, atheism and deism. Spinoza’s philosophy 
asserted a monistic metaphysics in which spirit and nature were identified. God was no longer 
the transcendent creator of the universe who ruled it via providence, but Nature itself, understood 
as an infinite, necessary and fully deterministic system of which humans are part (Dutton, in IEP 
2005).  
Idealism arose in Germany also as a response to the difference between appearances and “things 
in themselves” which the Kantian exposition brought about, as a project aimed at negating the 
thing in itself and tracing back the existence of both the object, (Nature) and the subject, 
(consciousness) to a transcendental unity. The movement was inspired by the philosophy of the 
Austrian Karl Reinhold, who maintained that philosophy could be derived from a single 
foundational principle. This, he maintained was “the principle of consciousness”, which was 
fundamental to all cognition (MCQuillan, in IEP 2012). On the basis of Spinoza’s theory of 
identity and following the wake of neoclassicist revival, the idealists attempted to reformulate a 
Neoplatonic metaphysics of unity between subject and object. This was attainable through an act 
of will (Fichte), an intuition beyond reason (Schelling) or through sheer logic (Hegel).  
According to Fichte, the major philosophic dilemma was whether to attribute primacy in the 
creation of subjective experience to Nature, intended as the objects of consciousness 
(dogmatism), or to the I or spirit, thereby asserting the independence of consciousness in the face 
of phenomena (idealism). Fichte opted for the latter, which he considered more rewarding 
especially in moral terms, for its stressing independence and freedom of the self, compared to the 
deterministic dogmatism. He thereby started the pursuit of reducing Nature to consciousness, 
which he intended as a “moral ego”, motivated by the “law of the ought”. This position was, 
however, criticized for being subjectivistic, and led Schelling to formulate a more naturalistic 
account of consciousness.  
The problem, for Schelling, was to give Nature a more tangible consistence toward the conscious 
reflection of the self, without, on the other hand, reifying it as something external to 
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consciousness. This, he accomplished through transforming the concept of Nature from the 
Fichtian not-I to a universal principle which gave rise to both self and not-self, in a temporal 
development in which Nature (not-I) was that which was not yet I. The ego, in other words, 
could never become the absolute principle of consciousness but could only subsist in the 
interdependent relation with the objects, i.e. the external world. In this way, Schelling came to 
conceive Nature in a Spinozian, pantheistic way, as an undifferentiated unity of subject-object, 
matter and consciousness, which only after the appearance of self-consciousness would come to 
differ from each other (Lamanna 1955, 31). For Schelling, this transcendental principle of 
immediate being, like the Neoplatonic One, could not be beholden but through an intellectual 
intuition; this was the act that made philosophical idealism possible, and without which the 
doctrine would result incomprehensible. 
The conception of intellectual intuition received harsh criticism by Hegel, which condemned it as 
mystical and irrational, since for him it was only a primitive and archaic form of knowledge 
which had to be overcome by logic. Hegel, therefore, overturned Schelling’s perspective 
affirming the superiority of the rational activity over intuition, through the construction of a 
“dialectic reason”. This was fully developed into a system which claimed to arrive at being 
through the mediation of the rational mind. Existence became, in his system, identified with the 
sole possibility of being thought intellectually, so that the world itself could be derived from 
thinking. This view implied arguably, a rather inflated and anthropocentric view of the self, in 
which Nature was such only in relation to man, intended as his thought “I am”. The Hegelian 
exposition, through its contributions to logic and its systematicity, came in the end to be the most 
influential and shaped a representative view of the otherwise multifaceted German idealism.  
The merits of this movement were that it presented an alternative to both rationalism and 
empiricism and eliminated the conception of “things in themselves”, (which was considered an 
oxymoron), by positing the necessity that these appeared always to a consciousness. The 
objections moved to this philosophy were, however, the risks of solipsism that it implied through 
an obscure logic distanced from the commonsense view of reality, and the difficulties of 
conciliating the transcendental subject (which was liable to degenerate into a “Cartesian” 
subject) with the otherness of Nature intended as a mere object of cognition. 
In the mid 1800’s the rise of empirical methods in the natural sciences and historical-critical 
methods in the humanities, together with the felt necessity of leaving behind speculative 
excesses, led to the decline of German idealism. In its place, a more epistemologically sober 
Neo-Kantianism was established in Germany as the dominant philosophical school at the end of 
the nineteenth century (McQuillan in IEP, 2012).  
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4.2 Phenomenology 
In the wake of idealism, another movement emerged in Germany in the early 20th century 
through the work of Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations. Phenomenology may be intended 
as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness, where phenomena represent the 
appearances of things, or things as they appear in our subjective experience (Woodruff, 2013). 
Phenomenology borrowed from idealism much of the terminology and theoretical standpoint and 
based its interpretation on the Scholastic notion of intentionality. Another borrowing from 
ancient traditions was the Neoplatonic distinction between phenomena and noumenon 
(consciousness). 
The focus of the inquiry is phenomena, which are considered regardless of their ontological 
status (independently existing or idealistic), but only in as much as they represent experiences 
from the subjective or first-person point of view. This approach, which characterizes 
phenomenology more as a discipline of subjective inquiry rather than a philosophical project in 
itself, reflects the maieutic purpose that the methodology adopts. The main features of 
phenomenologic inquiry are the epoché and the reduction. The first designates a parenthesizing 
of ordinary knowledge and beliefs about the world and represents a starting point of a radical 
reflection of consciousness, considered necessary to free the mind of judgments, presuppositions, 
etc., which are normally (unconsciously) superimposed on experience (Sander, 2013: 5). Epoché 
was a term originally in use by the skeptics which designated an attitude of suspension of belief, 
about e.g. the external world, leading to ataraxia, a state of unperturbed calm. 
The second term designates the reframing of all empirical experiences into “pure phenomena”. 
This conception may be interpreted psychologically as an aspiration to seeing the world with 
equanimity, through an apodictic knowledge which allows one to distinguish “the given” from 
opinions, and which underlies the “therapeutic” purposes kindled in phenomenology (possibly 
heritage of Husserl’s teacher Brentano and his background in psychoanalysis).  
Husserl’s methodology was later elaborated by many psychologists and philosophers who 
developed alternative interpretations around the meaning and import of the phenomenological 
reduction. The importance of Husserl’s work can hardly be overestimated for its influences in the 
20th century on e.g. Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Sartre for example derived his 
ontology from the phenomenological analysis of experience as constituted by the complementary 
aspects of the for-itself (consciousness) and in-itself (intentional object). The definition of 
consciousness as “empty” or transparent to itself reflects the Kantian conception of self as a 
transcendental subject, foundational to continental philosophy.  
This idea would be later criticized by Rorty in his “Philosophy and the mirror of nature”, by 
Heidegger’s critique of being as presence and by Derrida’s analysis of differance. In the second 
half of the last century, the arising within the analytic tradition of the discipline of Philosophy of 
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Mind brought about a renewed interest in phenomenology and a convergence of research 
interests in the analysis of consciousness and subjective experience as integrating the analysis of 
objective reality. 
 
 
5. ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY  
Analytic philosophy started in England in the early twentieth-century, through the works of 
George Moore and Bertrand Russell. The dominant philosophic stance prevalent at the time in 
the academia was British idealism, which was a radical form of metaphysical monism and anti-
realism. Reality was conceived as a single indivisible whole whose nature was mental or ideal. 
Objects of experience were considered not existing simpliciter (in se), but only in virtue of the 
“internal relations” they possessed with all the other objects, thus forming an interrelated whole 
(of meaning and/or substance), (Preston, in IEP 2006).    
Moore refuted this conception and endeavored to defend “common sense” and the existence of 
an external world through the formulation of a critical-realist theory of knowledge. Critical or 
indirect theories differ from direct (naïve) realism, which affirms the existence of mind-
independent objects, and postulate instead the existence of “intermediaries” between subject and 
object (i.e. the sense-data theory). A second innovation proposed by Moore was a new 
philosophical method which consisted in focusing on narrowly defined problems held in 
isolation, instead of system-building or grand philosophical syntheses typical of the continental 
tradition (ibid.). 
The attention to the structure of language and its relationship with the world gave analytic 
philosophy its peculiar linguistic imprint. Moore, and later Russell, articulated a linguistic theory 
of meaning based on a sense-reference structure. These terms represented the relationship 
between language and world, where the first constituted a mode of presentation or designation, 
while the latter indicated the designated object “in the world”, be it a person, a concept or a 
function. Reference to a “real” object (although reality was granted in Russell’s theory also to 
imaginary objects) was, according to this analysis, the criterion of meaningfulness of an 
expression, which determined its logical “truth-value”. 
The problems inherent the linguistic theory of proposition-meaning was the nature of these 
linguistic items, which was left intentionally ambiguous by Moore. If these possessed a mental 
nature, the theory would imply an indirect realism subject to skeptical objections and liable to 
reshape the theory into idealism. Moore’s move was, then, to make signifiers directly coincident 
with the objects designated (so as to make for example the world “table” identical with the actual 
object). The same reduction was also attempted in the sense-data theory for qualia, which were 
postulated as identical with the objects perceived. This sense-data version of direct realism 
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revealed itself untenable as subject to two major  objections: the argument of illusion (lack of 
corresponding object in hallucinatory experiences) and the argument from synthetic 
incompatibility (the same object's surface produces different sense-data for observers disposed at 
different angles, thus implying a contradiction in the assimilation of sense-data and object). 
Moore eventually failed to produce convincing argument in support of a realist theory about the 
existence of the external world (as something independent from experience) and of the validity 
of commonsense propositions about it.  
Russell later abandoned his propositional realism and together with Ludwig Wittgenstein 
developed the theory of “logical atomism” or ideal-language analysis, which characterizes a 
second phase of analytic philosophy. The logical consequences and purpose of this theory, as it 
emerges from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, were to demonstrate the meaninglessness of 
philosophical problems, by showing that they were “conundrums generated by a failure to 
understand the limits of meaningful discourse” (ibid.). From Wittgenstein’s Tractatus derived the 
conception of philosophy, in the analytic tradition, as a critique of language as source of 
metaphysical (i.e. abstract/irrational) speculation, and the idea that scientific facts about the 
natural world were the only valid objects of rational discourse. 
The emphasis on logic and natural science resulted in a subsequent evolution in the analytic 
tradition, which, beginning from the 1920’s, advanced a view of philosophical knowledge as 
completely identified with scientific knowledge. 
 
5.1 Logical Positivism  
The Vienna Circle was formed by a group of philosophers who sought to reconceptualize 
empiricism and to bring it to alignment with modern science. The group was also ideologically 
committed to eliminate superstition, religion and metaphysics as pre-scientific forms of thought 
(Mautner, 2005: 481-482). 
Their methodological stance was based on empirical evidence as the only acceptable form of 
knowledge, together with logical and mathematical statements which provided the rationalist 
basis accounting for the meaning of propositions. They denied however any synthetic a priori 
principle of knowledge. At the heart of Logical Positivism was the verification theory of 
meaning, which claimed that non-tautological statements have meaning only if they can be 
empirically verified. On the wake of Wittgenstein’s work, logical positivism embraced a view of 
philosophy as a tool to establish and enforce the limits of meaningful language through linguistic 
analysis. On this basis, non empirical-grounded views were dismissed by declaring them not 
merely wrong or false, but meaningless (Preston, in IEP 2006). Logical positivism advanced 
therefore a conception of philosophy (of science) as meta-theory, a “second-order” reflection of 
“first-order” sciences (Uebel, in SEP 2012).   
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One of the major causes of dismissal of Logical Positivism was due to a paradoxical flaw in its 
core tenet of verification, which held that non-tautological propositions had meaning only if they 
could be empirically verified. The verification principle, critics maintained, belonged to the same 
class of synthetic propositions (which necessitate empirical verification), and therefore rendered 
itself metaphysical and, by the same token, meaningless.  
Other weaknesses inherent the verification principle were that it undermined also the inductive 
theories which are commonly used to carry out scientific work (constituting the “gap between 
observation and theory”), without at the same time being able to eliminate non-scientific 
statements which it had endeavored to abrogate. 
The confutation of much of the postulates of Logical Positivism was subsequently carried out by 
Quine who, among other things, rejected the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
propositions. The analysis of ideal language as a philosophic project evolved in the 1950’s, 
giving way to an analysis of “ordinary language” which rejected categorical distinctions of 
propositions such as empirical vs. logical and stressed the role of philosophy as a tool for the 
simplification of speculative problems based on common and metaphysical language. 
 
5.2 Philosophy of Mind 
Philosophy of Mind is a discipline emerged in the latter half of the 20th century reflecting a 
revolution in the outlook of the discipline of psychology and in contrast to the conception of 
mind as a sphere of private access separate from the body (body-mind dualism). 
The development of psychology in the 19th century represented in fact a reiteration and 
accentuation of the “subjective turn” which had begun with rationalism and idealism, and which 
reached perhaps its climax in the discipline of phenomenology. Freudian psychology at its dawn, 
postulated the existence of a subconscious realm of thought governed by own laws which were 
not subject to rational control, in which the importance of the ego in cognitive processes was 
drastically diminished. Developments in the discipline, especially in the Anglo-American world, 
such as the “psychology of the ego”, however, did not take heed of Freud’s intuition that “the ego 
is not master in his own house” (Kapic in Kapic & McCormack, 2012) and supported the theory 
that the self possessed some free, functional processes independent from the id and super-ego. In 
response to such conceptions, which are nowadays addressed as “folk psychology”, the newly 
emerging discipline tried to formulate a more naturalistic account of psychological processes in 
terms of “publicly observable relations between stimuli and responses” (Jackson & Ray, 1998). 
The first philosophical theory of mind, elaborated by Watson and Skinner under the name of 
Behaviorism appeared contemporaneously with the Logical Positivist project and was popular in 
the decades 1920’s to 1950’s. This theory can be summarized, in its strong variety, as eschewing 
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descriptive frameworks in terms of mental states, to replace them with behaviors as the only 
empirical, scientifically analyzable data.  
Psychological Behaviorism's historical roots can be traced in the empiricist traditions of John 
Locke and David Hume and their theory of associationism. This theory states that mental 
processes operate by the association of one mental state with its successor states, relying on 
“introspectible entities”, such as perceptual experiences or stimulations as the first links in 
associations, and thoughts or ideas as the second links (Graham, in SEP 2010). Psychological 
behaviorism maintained that the descriptive framework in terms of “internal states”, such as 
thoughts and intentional propositions, should be eliminated in favor of reference to behavioral 
responses without making appeal to “mental events”. For behaviorists, in fact, discourses 
centered on subjective states of mind were not founded on a metaphysical subjectivity or a 
dualistic, non-physical presence of those states, and were to be reframed as a physicalist (monist) 
system. The theory of behaviorism in its strong formulation represents, therefore, a stance 
diametrically opposed to the continental-phenomenologic tradition of introspection based on an 
inner observer. 
In spite of representing arguably the accomplishment of the analytic philosophy’s tendency to 
empiricism and objectivity, Behaviorism came in disfavor through objections moved on two 
fronts. The first regarded the felt necessity of postulating some degree of representationalism 
(and thus mentalism) for the organism, in its perception of the environment, mediating between 
stimuli and behavior. The second was that (subjective) experience possesses characteristic 
qualities or feelings which allow us to think in terms of “what it is like” to be a certain organism 
and to distinguish between inanimate and sentient beings. The failure of Behaviorism to account 
satisfactorily for qualia, or conscious experiences and to distinguish them from mere behavior, 
such as in the case of pain, was a decisive argument for the abandonment of the research project. 
In the 1950’s and 60’s new theories of mind emerged to overcome the limitation of Behaviorism, 
such as the reductionistic Mind-Brain Identity Theory and Functionalism. The Mind-Brain 
Identity Theory stated some kind of correspondence between biochemical processes in the brain 
and mental events, either in terms of strict identity (type-type variant) or without fixed 
neurological correspondences (type-token) and expressing only a functional identity between 
brain states and mind. The second version led to what is now called Functionalism, which, in its 
strong variant, assimilates all mental states to the computational functioning of a machine. The 
problem of addressing the character of mental states without introducing a substance dualism 
was approached in the theory through identifying thinking with representational structures 
generated by computational algorithms (Thagard, in SEP 2012). The advantage of Functionalism 
over Behaviorism was that it allowed the explanation of mental states such as beliefs and desires 
in terms of causal relations between external and internal system variables (Searle, 1998). 
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Identity theories of all kinds received, however, a major, destabilizing criticism from Thomas 
Nagel in his famous article What is it like to be a bat? (1974). In his work, Nagel pointed out that 
the conscious quality of experience is incompatible with physicalistic explanations. According to 
the author, the ideal of Western science and Philosophy of Mind of moving toward a greater 
objectivity in their descriptive frameworks is incorrect, because they try to reduce the subjective 
point of view to an objective one, in an attempt to describe the “reality” shared by different 
individuals. This reduction would imply, according to the author, a “departure” from reality (as it 
is phenomenologically experienced), toward a rather more conceptual view of it. Nagel’s appeal 
to the phenomenological character of experience, in which consciousness is involved in every 
perceptual act as the “subject” of experience (ibid.: 437), can be seen as crystallizing a major 
turning point in Philosophy of Mind, characterized by the return of the phenomenological point 
of view in epistemological theories of cognition.   
 
5.3 Modern theories of perception 
Theories presently discussed in epistemology try in different ways, to reconcile realism (the 
existence of a mind-independent world) with the phenomenological perspective, intended as the 
intentional structure of (subjective) consciousness. These theories address therefore the 
experience of “what it is like” to perceive, or the capacity of experiencing phenomenologically. 
The Sense-data theory, precedently mentioned, is a form of indirect realism, and accounts for 
experience by postulating both an act of awareness (or apprehension) and an object apprehended 
in the form of a sense-datum (Bonjour, SEP, 2013). The latter are mental intermediaries (similar 
to qualia) which are used to explain the relation between mind and perceptual objects in the 
external world. The necessity of sense data is due to an argument which states that the same 
objects produce a vast range of phenomenal experiences under different conditions (e.g. light, 
observation angle, etc.), so that it is easier to account for perception of a sense-datum, rather than 
of an immediately accessible “real” object, which constantly is the way it appears. This results in 
a Kantian duality between the noumenon and phenomenon and constitutes a “metaphysical” 
aspect of this theory.  Sense-data are, moreover, “quite nebulous entities,” of a mental nature, but 
not reducible to brain phenomena, which, by interposing themselves between perceiver and 
objects perceived, are susceptible to give rise to skeptical objections of the Cartesian kind (Audi 
2011, 45).   
Another theory, the adverbial, maintains a “direct access” to experience by negating the necessity 
of sense data (e.g. “I experience a red patch”), and claiming a modification of the experience on 
behalf of the subject (“I am appeared redly,” ibid., 47). This is done in order to avoid the 
commitment to the existence of mental intermediaries which would otherwise imply a form of 
representationalism. The adverbial theory avoids, thus, the discussion about intermediaries, and 
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endeavors to overcome the dualism of noumenon and phenomenon by negating the distinction 
between external sensible objects and internal perceptions. All forms of cognition are thus 
(mental) states which are “adverbially” or subjectively modified. In this way the theory avoids 
skeptical objections, which challenge the reality and correspondence of mental representations 
with objects in the external world, at the price, however, of becoming rather indistinct from 
idealism.  
Another approach, although far less popular, resorts to sheer phenomenalism, and strips away 
objects of their substance and analyzes perception only in terms of sense-data (ibid., 54). This 
view holds that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist in themselves (non-
essentialism), but only as a bundle of perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli. 
Through the reintroduction of the phenomenal perspective of consciousness and subjectivity in 
studies of mind and perception, modern epistemology seems to have thus veered again toward 
themes dear to the continental tradition. Realist theories maintain, however, at their basis, a 
fundamental noumenon-phenomenon and/or a subject-object representational problem, which is 
the outcome of the duality mind-phenomena (or mind-objects, in case of naïve realism). The 
attempt to formulate linguistic explanations about the nature of the subject-object relation, such 
as in the case of the adverbial theory, suggests that much of the epistemological difficulties in 
reconciling phenomenology with realism are possibly of a verbal nature.  
It is timely, at this point, to summarize the specific arguments that Western continental and 
analytic philosophy have made thus far, in their analysis of the relationship between subject and 
object and mind and world, before turning to the analysis of the Indian philosophic systems and 
their solutions to these problems. 
 
 
6. CONTINENTAL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY CONFRONTED  
The Kantian idealist system brought the debate on the nature of reality and of man as its beholder 
to a phenomenological view of the human psychophysical apparatus as a transcendental 
container of phenomenal representations. Although realism was theoretically admitted, in 
practice phenomena in se were unknowable (noumenon) and always dependent on the a priori 
forms of human consciousness. This compromise between realism and idealism was successively 
criticized through a commitment mostly to idealism, in the continental tradition, or realism in the 
analytical. 
The continental tradition as carried out by the German idealists accentuated the subjective aspect 
of experience, and proposed a monistic account of human subjectivity as a transcendental ego, 
which replaced the concept of “God” in modern philosophy. This notion was dissimilar to the 
Cartesian res cogitans and was conceived not as an inner observer of an external world, but 
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rather as an “ultimate subjectivity”, embedded in Nature and manifesting in and as the historical 
emergence of self-consciousness from it. This form of objective idealism considered therefore 
Nature as a pantheistic, self-conscious, undifferentiated unity from which subject and object 
arose.  Further developments in the continental tradition including phenomenology and 
existentialism took subjective consciousness as the starting point in the formulation of 
epistemological theories. A major criticism addressed to continental philosophers was the 
perceived inability to account for the phenomenal world and the validity of commonsense 
knowledge without turning consciousness into a solipsistic Cartesian subject, and also for the 
sympathies of idealism for mysticism. The intentional character of consciousness, although 
“empty” or transparent to itself was criticized by analytic philosophers as liable of perpetuating 
the phenomenological fallacy of understanding oneself as a “glassy essence” (sec. Rorty) 
separate from the body and nature.  
In its early developments, the analytic tradition took instead realism (even naïve) and 
commonsense knowledge as both rational and epistemically justified, holding that the world is 
real, independent and accessible to consciousness. The commitment of many philosophers to 
physicalist monism left, however, unchallenged the theoretical problems posed by the enduring 
duality between hypostatized subject and object, and led to elaborated theses on how to bridge 
this gap. Positivist philosophy and Behaviorism tried to eliminate the subjective element and 
reduce experience to the empirical datum, the subjective mind being considered essentially a 
network of representational propositions about the world. In the latter half of the 20th century, 
instead, various theories within Philosophy of Mind such as Functionalism and Artificial 
Intelligence reintroduced consciousness, or subjectivity, but endeavored to explain it in terms of 
computational algorithms and largely regarded it as an epiphenomenon of brain matter. These 
views considered consciousness as merely the tip of an iceberg which consisted of unconscious 
computational brain processes.  
The recent turn to phenomenological analysis in epistemology, in analytic departments, and its 
emergence in neurologic cognitive theories, has restated the importance of consciousness and 
subjectivity in the phenomenological experience. The analysis of the relation between the 
conscious mind and the objective world of experience is carried out mostly via indirect realist 
models which hold the reality of both subjective consciousness and mind-independent objects. 
This conception has led to the formulation of dubious epistemological theories, like the sense-
data, which rather than supporting the inherent existence of objects, arguably complicate the 
phenomenological description through metaphysical, theoretical entities like qualia. The 
importance of the phenomenological perspective in experiencing, seems, however, to have been 
definitively restated in Philosophy of Mind. This is due to the recognition that in spite of the 
efforts to eliminate it from the scientific debate, or to reduce it to an objective, empirical 
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phenomenon, the conscious quality of experiencing must be considered an essential feature 
without which cognition would not be actually meaningful. The persisting difficulty in Western 
philosophy at present is to characterize what consciousness actually is, whether it can be equated 
with the notion of subjectivity or self, and what are its relations to the objective world.  
The self in continental philosophy is depicted as an empty container of phenomenological 
possibilities separate (transcendent) from the world, while in early analytic philosophy and in 
folk psychology as an embodied subject at the origin of an individual consciousness. This is 
considered affected by, but distinct from the physiologic processes of the body, while 
independent, but at the same time influenced if not completely determined by its environment 
and society. The equation of consciousness with an inner mind or self is therefore liable to 
reproduce the same difficulties inherent the subject-object duality, which seems to imply always 
a form of representationalism of the external world to a subject, whether this is intended as a 
“transcendental” or a more prosaic “empirical” ego.  Although modern interdisciplinary studies 
in cognitive science and psychology have started to eschew the view of self as an entity (sec. e.g. 
Blackmore, Chalmers, Churchland, Damasio and Dennet, among many others) a systematic 
theoretical framework accounting for the subjective quality of experience is still lacking. 
It is to address these unsurmounted problems in the modern conception of consciousness and 
subjectivity that I found relevant to present how two major Indian philosophic systems, Advaita 
Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism in the Madhyamaka school, have analyzed the relations 
between mind and world, and consciousness and phenomena. Both systems develop an ontology 
based on the claim of the absence of individual self. Advaita does so by affirming the identity of 
the self with the absolute Brahman, while Mahayana Buddhism denies its independent nature, 
and states that the essence of reality is shunyata, the void.  
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PART II 
 
 
 
 
身是菩提樹  The body is the tree of enlightenment. 
心如明鏡台  The mind is the stand of a bright mirror. 
時時勤拂拭  Wipe it constantly and with ever-watchful diligence, 
勿使惹塵埃  To keep it uncontaminated by the worldly dust. 
   
Shen-hsiu, aspirant 6
th
 Patriarch of Ch’an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
菩提本無樹  Enlightenment is no tree, 
明鏡亦非台  Nor is the Bright Mirror a stand. 
本夾無一物  Since it is not a thing at all, 
何處惹塵埃  Where could the dust alight? 
 
Hui-neng, 6
th
 Patriarch of Ch’an 
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1.  HINDU SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY 
The different schools of Indian philosophy are based on the Shrutis, or the four Vedas (dating 
approximately 1500-500 BCE), which are considered revealed texts of divine origin. The Vedas 
are a collection of mystical literature and do not represent a systematic philosophical exposition 
on the nature of reality. Six schools of Indian philosophy, defined orthodox by their allegiance to 
the Vedas, developed these insights into coherent systems. These are: 1) the Nyaya; 2) the 
Vaiseshika; 3) the Samkhya; 4) the Yoga; 5) the Purva-Mimamsa; and 6) the Uttara-Mimamsa or 
Vedanta (Ranganathan in IEP, 2005). These schools are named the Shad-Darsanas or “true 
points of view”, indicating different ways of contemplating reality, rather than six opposite 
philosophical standpoints.  
The Nyaya is the school of logics, which elaborates what in Western epistemology are the 
theories of knowledge and justification, and can be seen as an Indian equivalent of Aristotelian 
logic and analytic tradition. The Vaiseshika analyzes the constituents of reality in terms of atoms, 
properties and categories. Samkhya is the dualist school and maintains an irreducible distinction 
between consciousness, or Purusha, and matter Prakriti. Purusha corresponds to the Self, 
universal soul or spirit, while Prakriti is an unconscious, primordial substance which 
modifications give rise to the manifest world. To the Samkhya School belongs the theory of the 
three gunas, or dispositions of matter, the unbalance of which gives rise to the manifestation. All 
modes of existence are analyzed in 24 different categories which comprise the intellect, mind and 
sense of self (ahankara) which are also seen as transient manifestations of Prakriti, and are thus 
distinct from Purusha (Haney 2002, 42). The Samkhya system therefore considers both body and 
mind as material (although Prakriti cannot be equated with the notion of matter in Western 
science). The cosmological view of the system holds that Puruṣa, the eternal pure consciousness, 
due to ignorance, identifies itself with the manifestations of Prakriti such as intellect (buddhi) 
and ego (ahamkara) and undergoes the process of transmigration and suffering. However, once 
the realisation arises that Puruṣa is distinct from Prakriti, the Self is no longer subject to 
transmigration and achieves absolute freedom (mukti) (Larson 1998, 13). 
The Yoga system is based on Samkhya metaphysics and can be considered its implementation in 
terms of physical and mental practices, to bring about the discrimination between Purusha and 
Prakriti. Raja-Yogic practices focus on the restraint and control of the mind in order to reduce 
the “stains” or thoughts (vritti) of worldly objects, by means of which the individual soul attains 
union with the Self. 
Purva, or earlier Mimamsa is a school dedicated to the interpretation of the Veda in its ritualistic 
aspects and develops commentaries on e.g. the performance of ritual actions (karma) and 
theories on the distribution of merits.  It is not, therefore, a philosophy in itself but rather but an 
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exegetic exposition about the sacrificial activities and interpretations of canonical law for 
Brahmins.  
Uttara-Mimamsa or Vedanta, is a philosophical system based on the Upanishads, which is a body 
of esoteric texts appeared in a large span of time, possibly beginning in 1000 BCE. The focus of 
the system is on pure intellectual knowledge (jnana) and could be seen arising in opposition to 
ritualism which had characterized Brahmanism’s preoccupation with ritual action as means of 
spiritual advancement (the so called karma marga), (cf. Sarma 2011, 203). 
 
1.1 Vedantic Philosophy 
Vedanta is divided in three main schools: Dvaita, Visishtadvaita and Advaita, which most 
prominent philosophers are Madhva, Ramanuja and Shankara, respectively. These philosophies 
are not considered in opposition to each other, but rather as a hierarchy of points of view 
representing dualism, qualified monism and pure monism or nonduality. The final, absolute 
viewpoint which Vedanta advocates is expressed in Shankara’s treatise Vivekachudamani, or “the 
crown jewel of discrimination”, as: “Brahman alone is real; the world is unreal; the individual 
soul is not different from Brahman” (Sarma 2011). The focus of this exposition will be on this 
final philosophical standpoint, to which all other views are considered to subtend. 
Shankara’s philosophy is based upon the Upanishads, the Baghavad Gita and Brahmasutras, on 
which he wrote extensive commentaries based on logical, rational argumentation. These were 
later ampliated by numerous commentators and followers, so that the system developed over 
several centuries and reached its intellectual height by the end of the 16th century, approximately 
700 to 800 years after Shankara (Gupta 2004, 120). 
The focus of Shankara’s work is to give a systematic account of consciousness (cit), which is 
treated in the Upanishads in the context of explaining the nature of the Self (atman). The Self in 
Vedanta does not refer to the “empirical ego”, as in Western philosophy, but rather indicates the 
“pure consciousness” underlying the phenomenal individual. Moreover, the Self is not assumed 
as a feature characteristic of separate individuals (jiva-atman), but is held as identical with 
Reality (Brahman) as the substance out of which all things are made (ibid., 121). The identity 
atman-Brahman represents a fully-encompassing reality which does not leave room for 
something other, and is thus defined nondual (being “oneness” a positive determination liable of 
reifying the ineffable wholeness). Although unknowable in the representational way, the 
experience of reality is hinted at by the synthetic expression “satchitananda”, indicating its three 
aspects of sat (being), chit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss), (ibid). 
The underlying reality is therefore indescribable in language and unknowable in the traditional 
subject-object representational mode of knowledge. This, however, does not relegate the Self in a 
transcendental dimension because, as Shankara holds, atman is self-evident (Svatah-siddha). The 
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proof for the Self is thus not established by external factors or rational discourse because 
“beingness” is that which is present in every cognitive act. The argument which Shankara 
advances is therefore similar to the Cartesian cogito, and that is, that it is not possible to deny the 
Atman, because its negation presupposes the existence of the one who denies it. While Descartes 
equates his being with a res cogitans (the equivalent, possibly, of jivatman), Advaita, on the other 
hand, denies its identity as a phenomenal thing, and holds that atman is nir-vikalpa (unqualified).  
The Self is therefore not equitable with the empirical ego, and its characteristics can only be 
expressed apophatically as non-corporeal, eternal, while at the same time immanent and 
undeniable.  
In order to elucidate the claim of nonduality between Brahman and world, Shankara employs the 
Vedic concept of maya, which, although being popularly translated as “illusion”, is described in 
his metaphysics as a process of superimposition of “names and forms” (nama-rupa) upon the 
immutable Brahman (Radakrishnan, in Loy 1988, 66). All differentiations are considered 
appearances upon the absolute reality through modification of perceptions by overlaying 
thought-projections (vikalpa). The Sanskrit term vikalpa is in fact a compound of the prefix vi 
(discrimination or bifurcation) and kalpana (mentally constructed), (Loy 1988, 43). This process 
of superimposition is strictly related to the activity of memory, which projects past experiences 
onto Brahman, giving rise to false perceptions and ignorance (avidya) of Brahman. This 
deceitfulness is illustrated in the traditional metaphor of mistaking a coiled rope for a snake, and 
is liable, according to Shankara, to produce the illusion of a multiplicity of selves, and, through 
“limiting adjuncts” (upadhi), of an individual self through identification with the body (Sharma 
2011, 208).  
If the former argument clarifies the appearance of ontological multiplicity (of selves), the claim 
of nonduality between Brahman and world needs still be assessed. Advaita’s phenomenology of 
perception is different from the western, Husserlian one, and takes as starting point the 
conception of chit, or consciousness as self-luminous (and self-existing) (Gupta 2004, 121). The 
structure of consciousness, as is usually intended in Western philosophy is intentional, in the 
sense that it implies a subject-object relation. In Shankara’s philosophy, consciousness is 
described as the ultimate subject of every cognitive act, which has the capacity of manifesting all 
phenomena upon which it focuses. Consciousness, or Self, is provisionally thought of as always 
opposed to the non-self as the subject to the object, and is described in such guise as a witnessing 
consciousness (sakshin). Shankara, however, ultimately refutes the “relational” structure of 
consciousness, together with the dualist stance that a split between witness and phenomena 
would imply (such as that of the Samkhya system), and claims instead that the universe be the 
Self (Loy 1988, 197). The apparent paradox in this phenomenological description is of great 
importance in the understanding of the Advaitic claim of nonduality. The relational model of 
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phenomenological experience presents consciousness as a subject, either empirical or 
transcendental, which experiences a world separate from itself. The notion of subjectivity itself 
implies a reification of consciousness into a “cognizing essence”, such as a purusha, which, 
however deprived of characteristics, as the non-qualified Brahman, is liable of being reified into 
some “thing”.  Shankara, however, maintains that object-directedness itself is a vikalpa 
superimposition of thought-process upon consciousness (Gupta 2004, 125). Thus, for Shankara 
consciousness is not a possession of the ego, and is both without object and without subject. 
Intentionality is also a mere appearance superimposed upon non-intentional consciousness 
(ibid.). The nondual reality is identified, in Advaitic ontology, as the Atman-Brahman, a self-
luminous consciousness not knowable in itself, not separable from its manifestation, but also not 
reducible to it, as the whole is not the mere sum of its parts. In the following paragraph, this 
conception will be contrasted to the Buddhist claim that the ultimate essence of reality is 
shunyata, the emptiness. 
 
 
2.  BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 
Buddhist philosophy can be considered a set of metaphysical doctrines centered upon ridding 
devotees of bad “cognitive habits” leading to dukkha (suffering) and rebirth (Sarma 2011, 14). 
After the death of Siddhartha Gautama in the 5th-6th century BCE, doctrinal disputes arose 
leading to a splintering into a variety of schools, which encompass an ample range of 
philosophical and religious standpoints, and are presently grouped under three main 
denominations: Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. Theravada represents the modern 
designation of the first schools arisen in the 3rd century BCE, historically referred to as Hinayana 
(lesser vehicle). Mahayana (great vehicle) identifies the schools arisen from the northern 
spreading of Buddhism in China, Korea, Southeast Asia, Japan and Tibet in the 1st to 10th century 
ca. Vajrayana is usually considered a branch of Mahayana, present mostly in Tibet and 
characterized by its tantric practices.    
All Buddhist schools have nonetheless in common their succession lineages and observance to 
the doctrines ascribed to the historical figure of Siddhartha Gautama. The early speeches of the 
founder, which are summarized in the four noble truths and the eightfold path, constitute a set of 
basic tenets to which all schools adhere. The four noble truths are in a nutshell: 1) there is 
suffering; 2) it has a source; 3) it can end; 4) there is a path that leads to its end.  
The main cause of suffering is “attachment” to things, which is considered delusionary, since all 
objects are transient (sarvam anityam). This philosophic stance is held both toward the notion of 
a personal self, and also toward things in general, which are considered deprived of substance (in 
the Aristotelian sense). The psychological constitution of the “sentient being” is an association of 
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five aggregates (skandhas). These are described as mental forms and dispositions, which are 
classified as: rupa (form) vedana (feeling), samjna (perception) samskaras (thought constructs) 
and vijnana (consciousness), (ibid. 15). 
The consideration of the transitory nature of the world led Gautama to formulate the doctrine of 
anatman (no-self), arguably in polemic, or as a restatement of the Hindu notion of atman, or “all-
self”. A second foundational doctrine of early Buddhism is that of “interdependent origination” 
(pratityasamutpada) which holds that everything arises in dependence upon multiple causes and 
conditions. No causa sui object or entity can thus be admitted, because the causal chain leading 
to any event must include the universe as a whole. This doctrine therefore, reconnects itself to 
that of anatman by claiming that it is not possible to identify an independent, inherently existing 
self. A third mainstay of Buddhism is the principle of emptiness (shunyata). This concept is 
given different emphasis and meaning in the various Buddhist schools, but is generally 
understood as an ultimate (conceptual) definition of reality, referring to the absence of inherent 
essence of phenomena, or to the non-self nature of the five aggregates. 
Buddhist epistemology analyzes therefore the relationship between consciousness and 
phenomena taking a different starting point than Advaita and Western epistemology, and 
emphasizes the nondual quality of shunya as encompassing a world of interconnected 
phenomena lacking independent existence. An instance of the classic distinction between the 
phenomenal world and an immutable reality “behind it”, similar to that of the Western 
metaphysical tradition, (from Parmenides through Kant), can, however, be found in the Pali 
Canon’s Fire Sermon, where an injunction is made to develop aversion to sense-organs, sense-
objects, sense-contact and sense-consciousness (Loy 1988, 38). This conception can be seen as 
related to the ideal of arhat of early Buddhism (and Hinduism), as a saint with miraculous power 
and ascetic temperament (Bond in Kieckhefer & Bond 1988, 160), and possibly exerted a 
considerable influence on the development of monastic and ascetic currents. This notion shows a 
close affinity with the Hindu dualist systems (the Samkhya and Yoga) which endorse 
renunciation through rejection of sensory experiencing as a way of approaching ultimate reality.  
This ideal is nonetheless contradicted elsewhere, in Buddhism, such as in one of the Pali Canon’s 
Honeyball suttas, which maintains a phenomenal (nondual) epistemology as the hallmark of 
nirvana (awakening): “in the seen there will just be the seen, in the heard, just the heard; in 
smelling, touching, tasting, just smelling, touching, tasting; in the cognized, just the cognized” 
(Loy 1988, 39). This view rehabilitates sense-perception as not being problematic per se, and 
indicates the way of phenomenological renunciation endorsed in the Fire Sermon (suppression of 
skhandas), as perhaps, at most, a preliminary method of inquiry into the nature of subjectivity, 
rather than an ultimate philosophic view on the nature of reality. 
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In order to provide a very general characterization of contemporary Buddhism and distinguish 
between the two major traditions of Theravada and Mahayana, it could be stated that Theravada 
maintains generally a dualistic view of awakening, where nirvana is seen as something radically 
different from the everyday world that can be perceived by the senses; Mahayana, on the other 
hand, endorses a nondual view and holds that nirvana and samsara (the world of transmigration 
and suffering) are experiences of the same reality viewed from different standpoints. Mahayana 
philosophy furthermore, through the worldlier ideal of Bodhisattva (cf. Lopez in Kieckhefer & 
Bond 1988, 179), does not advocate the elimination of phenomenal experience, and lays instead 
emphasis on the non-conceptual nature of reality, where the essence of phenomena (including 
oneself) is that of illusory thought constructs. In this essay, the choice will be to focus upon the 
Mahayana tradition, and particularly on the Madhyamaka school, on the basis of its 
deconstruction of metaphysics of substance (of all things, or dharmas) and on its ascribing 
ultimate reality to the ineffable shunya. 
  
2.1 Madhyamaka Philosophy 
Mahayana Buddhism is divided into two major schools, the Yogacara and Madhyamaka. 
Yogacara, which has its roots in the 4th century CE, is an idealist school which emphasizes the 
mental nature of perceptions, maintaining that everything is cittamatra (mind-only), (Sarma 
2011, 20). This system focuses on the implementation of the doctrine of emptiness through yogic 
practices, as the name suggests, and does not develop a thorough philosophic system, being the 
first-hand experience of shunyata the main goal of the school. The Madhyamaka, or middle-way 
school, was founded by Nagarjuna in the 2nd century CE and exerted an enormous influence on 
Mahayana Buddhism in lands such as China, Japan, Korea, Vietman, etc. coming to be 
considered, in Tibetan doxographical literature as the philosophically definitive expression of 
Buddhist doctrine (Arnold in IEP, 2005).  
Nagarjuna’s philosophy is based on the prajnaparamita literature (the perfection of 
transcendental wisdom), which appeared in India around the first century CE. These texts, at the 
base of Mahayana, represented a further development from the previous Buddhist philosophical 
teaching of the Abhidharma. This teaching was considered nonetheless propedeutic for the 
understanding of the prajnaparamita. The prominent feature of Madhyamaka philosophy is the 
confutation that dharmas, (all phenomenal manifestations constituents of things which make up 
the skhandas or the totality of human experience), possess substantial existence. These factors 
were held in Abhidharma literature, as ultimately real entities endowed with inherent existence 
(svabhava). Nagarjuna criticized this “ontologizing” of phenomena by maintaining that the 
causal dependence expressed in the pratityasamutpada doctrine pertained also the dharmas, 
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(since everything lacks independence). Even the notion of shunya, on the other end, would not 
escape this principle, and was thus understood to be dependently originated (Sarma 2011, 21).  
Nagarjuna’s dialectical method is based on the demonstration of the relativity of all concepts, by 
showing their dependence upon their opposites. The paradoxical character of this doctrine (or no-
doctrine) emerges in Nagarjuna’s refusal to reify any philosophical position, including his own. 
He, therefore, does not provide any positive definitions of reality, but assumes the task of 
dismantling all other philosophical positions. As he expresses in his foundational text, the 
Mulamadhyamakakarikas: “The spiritual conquerors proclaimed emptiness to be the exhaustion 
of all theories and views.  Those for whom emptiness is itself a theory, they declare to be 
incurable” (quoted in Loy 1998, 20). The concern of the author is thus to avoid “conceptual 
extremes” and to tread a middle way between them, in order to avoid the philosophical fallacies 
of reification and nihilism alike. In the case of dharmas, these are held as neither existing in 
themselves, nor as non-existing. The dichotomy nirvana-samsara, of major importance in 
Buddhist soteriology, is also similarly deconstructed and understood to be empty (shunya). 
Emptiness must, in final analysis, also be understood as empty of itself.  
The ruthless application of the doctrine of interdependence allows therefore Nagarjuna to 
overcome the philosophical problems connected with asserting a monism which substantiates 
either shunya or the dharmas (representing a polarity akin to consciousness and phenomena) in 
the attempt to define what ultimate reality is. Because of the interdependence of the terms, 
neither can be established as having its own independent nature, being or substance.  
The goal of Madhyamaka is nonetheless soteriological and aimed at the attainment of a “higher 
truth” (paramartha) which although not describable (being descriptions conceptual 
superimpositions upon reality), can be experienced. The purpose of negating the autonomous 
character of opposites and rejection of essentialism implies, for Nagarjuna, the experience of a 
reality which excludes any theorizing about it. Its nondual character lies in the impossibility of 
abstracting an observer from it, and still less to formulate an ontology of separate, autonomous 
entities. As Loy suggests: “All philosophical views are attempts to grasp the nature of this 
nondual experience from the conceptual and hence dualistic standpoint” (1998, 272).  
The subject-object relation in Madhyamaka is, in such guise, thoroughly deconstructed through 
the negation of self, of inherently existing (mind-independent) phenomena and, finally, of a 
transcendental “container” of phenomenal appearances (shunyata). This is the standpoint viewed 
as “highest”, and represents the essence of Madhyamaka Buddhism. The ultimate response to the 
question about the nature of reality is thus for Nagarjuna, (as for Wittgenstein), to remain silent. 
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3.  COMPARISON BETWEEN ADVAITA AND MADHYAMAKA  
The two Indian philosophic systems analyzed, present two apparently antithetic conceptions of 
reality defined either as nondual, or as empty. These systems present however, noteworthy 
similarities which must be contextualized in the dialectical interaction which the two cultures 
have historically entertained. 
In order to understand the “core doctrine”, (sec. Loy), which can be extracted from these 
systems, it is necessary to keep in mind that Advaita is an orthodox Hindu philosophy committed 
to the theistic notion of Brahman. This concept was, however, restated by Shankara through the 
discrimination between saguna Brahman (or Ishvara, rather similar to the Western notion of 
God) and the transcendental, attribute-less nirguna Brahman, akin to the Neoplatonic One, and 
representing the philosophical infinite. Buddhism developed in reaction to the Brahmanic 
religion and against the supremacy of the priestly cast and proposed itself, instead, as a non-
theistic “doctrine of liberation”, with both social and spiritual connotations. 
Given the historical contrapositions of these religious philosophies, it is understandable that their 
expositions developed from two opposite positions, to arrive arguably at the same understanding 
of reality. The common standpoint of these systems is the absence of personal self and the 
assertion of the existence of an ineffable reality underlying the world of distinctions and 
multiplicity. This is achieved in Advaita, through the expansion of the Self into a universal 
principle encompassing all reality, and the denial of the substantial nature of beings and objects; 
in Buddhism, through the deconstruction of the self and the conflation of the subject into the 
phenomenal objects. If, however, these philosophies are to advance not merely a monist, but a 
nondual thesis, these standpoints must be further elaborated upon.  
Advaita stresses the nature of Brahman, provisionally, as a “witnessing consciousness” or 
ultimate subjectivity, which can never know itself because it is the knower. The existence of this 
principle cannot be empirically demonstrated but is, nonetheless, intuitively known by the sheer 
fact that existence is happening. This Brahman-consciousness, however, does not amount to a 
subjective idealism, and Advaita stresses that the intentional structure of consciousness (i.e., the 
opposition subject-object) is a mental construct superimposed on the nondual Brahman (reality). 
The witnessing awareness, or sense of being, cannot be conceptualized (represented) neither 
experienced, and does not belong to an individual consciousness. From this fact, derives the 
claim that consciousness encompasses everything, as a formless, empty space. This is conveyed 
in the Upanishad through the identification of akasha (ether, the fifth, non manifested element) 
with Brahman. 
Madhyamaka Buddhism, on the other hand, eliminates the notion of subjectivity by maintaining 
that the constituents of phenomenal experience (skhandas) do not amount to a personal self, 
being impermanent and lacking independent existence. Ultimate reality comes thus to be 
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described as emptiness. This term, however, is always relative to its opposite, form (phenomena). 
Just as consciousness is an interrelational function inseparable from what is considered to be its 
object, likewise in the Heart Sutra it is stated that “emptiness is not other than form; form is not 
other than emptiness”. Emptiness therefore cannot be substantialized as an independent reality 
and cannot be conceived as an essence separate from phenomena, just like space is only such due 
to the appearance of objects within it. 
Through this conception it can be seen now how the definition of ultimate reality as shunyata 
and Brahman may possibly be two ways of describing the same nondual experience from 
different angles. On the one hand consciousness is the whole, and phenomena are temporary 
appearances within it (Advaita). On the other, consciousness is no thing and only phenomena 
appear, although these never exist independently as substantial entities (Mahayana Buddhism). In 
the first case, ontological reality is given to an immutable essence underlying all change. In the 
latter, only an interdependent and impermanent flow of change exists, and no ontological 
conclusions can be drawn from it.  
The dialectical relationship between these two philosophies reflects the different standpoints of 
being and becoming. In spite of being a concern only of Eastern, “mystical” traditions, these 
conceptions are present also in Western philosophy and find their parallel in the debate between 
Parmenides and Heraclitus, with which this essay started. The next chapter will address the 
relevance of the nondual perspective for modern Western philosophy’s discussion on the nature 
of consciousness, self and subjectivity. 
 
 
4.  DISCUSSION  
Philosophic inquiries about the nature of reality in Western culture, have traditionally taken two 
major alleys. One is the idealistic current, which starts with the internal world of the self or the 
transcendental, non-manifest being, and denies the reality and/or independent existence of the 
material world in respect to that principle. Ultimate reality, according to this standpoint, is the 
mind, while physical reality is considered a mind-dependent, immaterial construct. 
The second is realism, which is the epistemological view which holds that a mind-independent 
world exists, comprising a plurality of things and beings whose properties and phenomenal 
qualities are inherent in themselves. The mind, in this system, is regarded as originating from 
matter (physicalism) and produced by brain activity through some correspondence between 
biochemical processes in the brain and mental events. 
Both philosophic traditions, in their strong variants, represent an attempt to formulate a monistic 
account of reality by reducing it to a mental or material substance respectively. The rejection of 
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substance-dualism represents a common trend in modern philosophy which avoids the problems 
of interaction between substances (e.g. mind and body). 
One fundamental challenge arises, however, for each system. If idealism is to have any practical 
purpose, it should escape the equation of consciousness with subjectivity as it would lead to 
solipsism, and explain its relation to the external world without refuting commonsense 
knowledge about it. Realism, on the other hand, should overcome the problems of 
representationalism created by the dichotomy consciousness-phenomena, without simply 
negating the former, and reconcile the metaphysical subject-object gap which such view implies.  
Nondual philosophies such as Advaita Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism may provide a solution, 
I maintain, to these epistemological problems. In the following paragraph I will try to review 
both idealist and realist accounts, and present the cognitive perspective of a “nondual 
epistemology”. 
 
4.1 Idealism, Realism and Nonduality 
Idealism recognizes the importance of the human “structure of consciousness,” granted by the 
psychosomatic apparatus in determining the conditions of experience. From Kant onward, the 
importance of the a priori forms of sensibility could not be ignored in the formulation of 
epistemological theories. This amounts to assert that the human sensory system does not simply 
perceive an external world, but is actively involved in its phenomenological manifestation. The 
world may in fact be considered as an infinite range of phenomenological possibilities (extended 
for example, for the sense of sight, to the whole electromagnetic spectrum), which are 
subjectively realized by each organism under the conditions given by its different physiology, 
(which varies moreover from a species to another). The spatial appearance of the world, objects 
and their sensitive qualities can also be understood, according to the idealist critique, as 
manifestations of consciousness, or transcendental ego, which encompasses them. Strong 
versions of idealism take an anti-realist stance toward sensible objects, which are considered 
misty, unsubstantial and wholly dependent on perception by mind. If the latter is equated, 
however, with subjectivity, as in some phenomenological interpretations, this would reiterate the 
subject-object duality between the empty container and its intentional objects or, in theology, 
between God and the world.  
Realist philosophies have, until recently, dismissed subjectivity entirely and directed their focus 
toward the objective world, endorsing materialism in a pragmatic support of the natural sciences. 
Behaviorism attempted to reduce the subjective point of view to an objective one, by studying 
consciousness empirically, through a third-person perspective. After the decline of this project, 
since the 1950’s, consciousness returned in the analytic philosophy’s discourse in the theories of 
Functionalism and later Cognitive Science. Modern theories of consciousness are materialistic 
34 
 
and resort to a number of disciplines such as neurophysiology, artificial intelligence and 
cognitive psychology to account for the functions of consciousness. Consciousness is, however, 
never considered “in itself”, but as brought into momentary existence by dynamic processes such 
as memory, learning, cognition, etc., which should be rather analyzed as representing the 
intentional functions of consciousness. These theories constitute therefore a reduction of 
consciousness to “mind phenomena,” or of the cognizing aspect of consciousness to its content. 
In psychology, this misunderstanding manifests in the confusion between consciousness and self-
consciousness, or ego, and the identification of what can be now understood as an intentional 
structure or vikalpa thought-construction, with the “pure” consciousness, or beingness, without 
which no such structures could arise. Only recently, in analytic philosophy it has been noted that 
these mental functions are to be considered “easy” problems in terms of neurological 
understanding (sec. David Chalmers) in comparison with the much more mysterious event of 
consciousness itself, or why qualia (e.g. pain or the experience of sight) are at all experienced. If, 
therefore, a dualistic conception of consciousness is to be rejected, consciousness should not be 
equated neither with the empirical ego, nor with transcendental ego (a rather misfortunate 
expression, although much more refined, it could be argued).  
It is timely, at this point, to introduce the nondual conception of consciousness, as it emerges 
from the “core theory” presented in Advaitic and Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. Consciousness 
is referred to in Advaita as the “sense of being” which has to be understood not as a state of mind 
activity referencing the ego, but as a non-conceptual ground upon which such activity is 
cognized. This “principle of consciousness” cannot be comprehended or grasped through an 
intentional (object-directed) act, because it is prior to it. No empirical “proof” of it can be 
therefore given, but none is necessary either, for Shankara, insofar as to doubt it presupposes the 
cognition of such event by that very essence. This principle is called in Advaita the Self, which is 
said to be equal with the unqualified, absolute Brahman. The “personal” dimension of experience 
is thus transcended and integrated into the universal principle. 
Buddhism, analogously, analyzes the concept of personal existence as fallacious, because it can 
be reduced to the interplay of phenomena (the five aggregates) which lack permanence and 
inherent existence. Ultimate reality is, on the other hand, not to be equated with a “higher Self”, 
as this concept is prone to be reified into some inherently existing ontological principle, but 
should be rather emptied of all ontological claims to be experienced in its facticity (tathata).  
Nagarjuna, furthermore, states that consciousness is not to be analyzed as an ultimate principle 
separate from phenomena, because it arises interdependently with them, as the passage from the 
Hart Sutra quoted before states. If this position seems to rehabilitate the phenomenological 
understanding of intentionality, (interdependence of subject-object), and even cognitive theories, 
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it should be remembered that this momentary and interdependent phenomenon of consciousness 
does not arise for a subject beholding a world, but for or as the impermanent flux of shunyata. 
By way of a conclusion of this study, it may be useful to conjecture, in practice, what the 
nondual cognitive perspective could amount to, since its soteriological implications are the sole 
purpose and concern of these spiritual traditions.  
A widely accepted Western-world view holds consciousness as being the propriety of an entity 
which experiences the body and internal states. The ego, however, is substantialized by the 
reflective activity of thought, which at some point of the intellectual development, become self-
referencing (“I am thinking”). This process grounds itself on a seemingly continuous self, which 
is the conceptualization of a personal essence based on the association of the sense of being 
(consciousness) with the body. Experiences, thoughts and mental states are thus interpreted as 
occurring to a self, and this dualism is extensively supported by the use of language structured in 
an intentional way. Underlying this dualistic mental activity is, however, the neurological unity 
of perception, which is due to a reciprocal interaction between the organic physiology and the 
material conditions of the world, giving rise to phenomenal experience. Various ontological 
meanings have been given to the nondual view in philosophical and religious traditions, such as 
wholeness, emptiness or God’s grace, although no philosophical description can capture it. The 
pre-conceptual, cognitive nature of this primordial mind is hinted at in Indian nondual traditions 
with expressions such as space-like awareness or Buddha-mind. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Western culture has grown largely oblivious of the metaphysics of consciousness, present in 
Eastern philosophies, as well as in its own philosophic and theological genealogy. This was 
historically motivated by an attempt to come to an objective description of reality and by the 
need to abandon superstition, mysticism and religious narratives in which the issue was 
shrouded. The empiricist/realist account of the world in terms of individual bodies and material 
substances ignored thus consciousness, and came, in time, to consider it an epiphenomenal 
outgrowth of matter. This attitude produced a tension between scientific and humanistic 
disciplines, which have been traditionally more sensitive to the relational aspect of knowledge, 
implying a being in the world which has to include a degree of subjectivity in the reciprocal 
interaction between opposites (e.g. knower and known, reader and text).  The awareness of 
subjectivity has sometimes, perhaps, in continental philosophy, slipped into the solipsism of 
considering the world as deriving from a subjective mind. 
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Western philosophy starts from a duality of substances, the mental (conscious) and the material 
(unconscious), and alternatively eliminates one in favor of the other to arrive at monism. The 
rather recent reintroduction of consciousness in the scientific debate has resulted in clumsy 
attempts to explain the relations between subjectivity and the world in epistemology and 
cognitive studies.  
Conceptual impasses in classical problems of Western philosophy, such as the mind-body and 
consciousness-matter relations find a philosophically coherent resolution in nondual traditions 
such as Advaita Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhism. Nondual philosophies assert not a subjective 
idealism, but the lack of any subject owning an individualized consciousness. The experience of 
subjectivity and selfhood is considered a thought-based, fictional construction superimposed 
onto the nondual reality. This perspective, however, is admitted not only theoretically, and 
practical means are devised in these traditions for the realization of this insight. This theory is 
meant, therefore, to be not just a philosophical expedient, but an experiential realization bringing 
about a sense of freedom from psychological constraints.  
The theory herewith presented, I argue, is consistent with modern scientific notions of e.g. 
neurology, ecology and sociology which see the human organism embedded in a deterministic, 
interrelated web of matter, energy and information represented by its natural and social 
environment. If the striving after objectivity led such disciplines to reject ontological 
assumptions such as the disembodied self, the rediscovered importance of the role of the 
observer in scientific theories hints to the possibility that the nondual analysis of consciousness 
as co-arising with the natural world may represent a viewpoint compatible (and predating) the 
scientific-empirical.  
These conclusions offer, I believe, also an important perspective on the much debated issue of 
the phenomenological import of religious experiences, which constitutes a focus of lively 
academic discussion. Considering consciousness as a private sphere of incommunicable, 
subjective experiencing, led post-essentialist scholars to relegate eschatological accounts to the 
sphere of faith.  The analysis of consciousness proposed by nondual traditions, instead, exalts the 
subjective perspective to the point of its pantheistic coincidence with Nature, which reveals itself 
as the synthesis between objectivity and subjectivity, and of realism with idealism. This is, I 
believe, the contribution that religious philosophy can make to bridge the gap between the 
empirical and the subjective approaches to knowledge and wisdom. 
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